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goods, we show that the best-case scenarios hold when technology and so-
cial capital both support just one of the two productions at the expenses of
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1 Introduction
Solaria was a planet inhabited by Spacer descendants1 . The 50th and last Spacer
world settled, it had perhaps the most eccentric culture of all of them. Origi-
nally, there were about 20,000 people living alone in vast estates. Solarians’ lives
were marked by technology: citizens never had to meet, save for sexual contact
for reproductive purposes. All other contact was accomplished by sophisticated
holographic viewing systems, with most Solarians exhibiting a strong phobia
towards actual contact, or even being in the same room as another human. All
work was done by robots: there were indeed thousands of robots for every So-
larian. As centuries went by, Solaria became even more rigidly and obsessively
isolationist. The planet cut off all contact with the rest of the Galaxy (although
continuing to monitor hyperspatial communications). Its inhabitants geneti-
cally altered themselves to be hermaphroditic. At the final stage of Solarian
civilization, the human inhabitants vanished, giving the impression that they
had died out, although they had in fact withdrawn underground; their estates
continued to be worked by millions of robots.
Solaria is a fictional planet in Isaac Asimov’s Foundation and Robot series.
The author draws on this metaphor to warn against the risks of dehumaniza-
tion that may be brought about by an excessive and indiscriminate technical
progress. In the 1950s, Asimov’s novel well embodied the common fear accord-
ing to which technology would have progressively destroyed social interaction.
Today, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, our lives are marked by
technology almost as those of Solarians. The widespread diffusion of the broad-
band, the internet revolution, and the true explosion of online networks like
Facebook, Flickr and Twitter is worrying social scientists, who fear the risk
of growing relational poverty. However, the evidence on such fears is not con-
vincing. Drawing on GSS data, McPherson and Smith-Lovin (2006) show that
social isolation mostly affects families with a high propensity to technological
consumption. According to some authors, communication technologies lower
the probability of having face-to-face visits with family, neighbors, or friends in
one’s home (Boase et al. 2006, Gershuny 2003, Nie et al., 2002). Wellman et al.
(2006) note that internet usage may even interfere with communication in the
home, creating a “post-familial family” where family members spend time in-
teracting with computers, rather than with each other. Burke et al. (2009) find
that more intensive Facebook use is associated with lower actual contact and
higher loneliness. On the other side, Frenzen (2003) finds that internet use is
not associated with a reduction in social interaction. Rather, the time devoted
to the web is taken away from that spent on watching television. Drawing on
survey data from a Canadian suburb, Hampton and Wellman (2003) show that
1The planet Solaria first appeared in “The naked sun”, the second novel in Isaac Asimov’s
Robot series. The novel was first published in 1957 after being serialized in Astounding Science
Fiction between October and December 1956. Solaria is also the background of the third novel
of the Robot Series, “The robots of dawn”, first published in 1983. Then, the planet appeared
again in the fifth novel of the hyper-celebrated Foundation Series, “Foundation and Earth”,
first published in 1986.
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high-speed access to the Internet enhances neighboring and increases contact
with weaker ties. Ellison et al. (2007) find a positive and strong relationship
between Facebook usage and bridging social capital in a sample of undergradu-
ate students. More recent studies show that participation in online communities
significantly enhances social capital in the form of networks and trust (Putnam
and Kolko, 2009, Valenzuela et al., 2009, Vergeer and Pelzer, 2009a, 2009b).
GSS data are used also by Robinson and Martin (2010), who find that internet
use is not consistently correlated with lower levels of socializing or other social
activities. This literature suffers from three main shortcomings: 1) results are
conflicting; 2) the boom in online networks is so recent that we still lack suitable
data to analyze the relationship between social participation and technology in
the long run; the literature, still confined to the fields of applied psychology
and computer-mediated communication, is mostly based on very limited case
studies, so that its results can be hardly generalized; 3) in economics, we lack
theoretical analyses addressing the causal mechanism. The relationship between
growth, technology and social interaction has in fact been addressed mainly with
regard to the ability of social norms and networks to foster economic growth
(Knack and Keefer, 1997, Bartolini and Bonatti, 2002, Annen, 2003, Cozzi and
Galli, 2009, Dearmon and Grier, 2009), or technology adoption both in devel-
oped high income areas (Burt, 1987, Akcomakak and ter Weel, 2009, Braguinsky
and Rose, 2009), and in rural poor contexts (Conley and Udry, 2001, Barr, 2002,
Isham, 2002). The reverse effects exerted by growth and technology on social
participation are so far a rather neglected topic. Thus, it is still unpredictable
whether the “Solaria syndrome” is an actual risk for developed countries. This
paper aims to improve our understanding through a theoretical analysis ad-
dressing the sources and the evolution of social participation and social capital
in a growing economy characterized by exogenous technical progress. We start
from the assumption that the well-being of agents depends on the consumption
of two goods: a private good and a socially provided one. Individuals allocate
their time between “private” activities, i.e. the production and consumption of
material goods, and social participation, i.e. the production and consumption
of relational goods. Following Coleman (1988, 1990), we assume that social
participation incidentally generates durable ties as a by-product. In the long
run, such ties accumulate in a stock which constitutes the “social capital” of the
economy. To implement the claims from the empirical literature (see Sabatini,
2007, for a review), we assume that such stock, besides facilitating social par-
ticipation, also plays a role in the production of material goods. In principle,
private and relational goods serve different needs. However, we introduce the
possibility that, thanks to the help of technology, private goods can substitute
for relational ones in the satisfaction of social needs. If the surrounding envi-
ronment is socially poor, people may prefer to chat with unknown and distant
people through the web instead of talking with neighbours. Even when material
consumption is patently unable to satisfy social needs, it can at least compen-
sate for the deprivation of human relations: for example, agents may comfort
themselves for the lack of a bowling team by playing a virtual match against
a computer. Following interesting hints from political science, we also assume
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that on the job interaction contributes to the creation of durable ties thereby
influencing the time evolution of social capital (Karasek, 1976, Greenberg, 1986,
Mutz and Mondak, 2006, Adman, 2008). In such a theoretical framework, we
introduce an exogenous technical progress affecting the productivity of both
the private and the relational spheres of the economy. This set of assumptions
allows us to explain the growing social isolation often accompanying economic
development as a result of the process of substitution between the two kinds of
goods. Such process may cause the erosion of the entire stock of social capi-
tal, thereby leading the economy to fall down in a “social poverty” trap. Our
primary research questions are: is it possible to avoid such collapse? Are there
paths of sustainable development where technical progress and growth do not
take place at the expenses of social participation? Or are we destined to live
ever more comfortable, but isolated and unhappy, lives? Our work contributes
to the literature by assessing whether the Solaria syndrome is an actual risk, in
the belief that a better understanding of the mechanisms supporting the syn-
drome would be a first step along the path to find a cure. Namely, we identify a
configuration of parameters under which the economy is more likely to reconcile
growth and technology with social participation. Such a setting of the model
offers guidelines for policy makers interested in improving the well-being of cit-
izens through the preservation of the relational sphere of their lives. Moreover,
we contribute to the cross-disciplinary debate by implementing into an analyti-
cal framework a complex set of assumptions modelled around the findings of the
previous empirical literature in economics, sociology, and political science. The
rest of the paper is organized as follows. The related literature and our main
assumptions will be discussed in the review in Section 2 and within the set up
of the model described in Section 3. Sections from 4 to 6 analyze the dynamics
of the model. Section 7 addresses the effect of technical progress. The paper is
closed by some concluding remarks.
2 Related literature
Human relations matter for happiness and well-being. This statement sounds so
obvious that most people would be surprised to know that the analysis of social
interactions is quite a novelty in the contemporary economic debate. In tradi-
tional economics, the agents’ utility basically depends on material consumption
and leisure time. In this framework, the economic action can be represented as
a time allocation choice between working and leisure activities. Working allows
people to gain the income necessary to buy those material goods that will be
consumed in the leisure time. Such a narrow view of economics began to be
questioned in the 1970s. According to Manski (2000), “Since then a new phase
has been underway, in which the discipline seeks to broaden its scope while
maintaining the rigor that has become emblematic of economic analysis” (115).
As a result, the idea that the economic behavior of agents is deeply rooted in the
social and moral spheres of their lives is now commonly accepted in the debate.
Still, it is worth noting that this view is notably older than either the recent be-
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havioral economics literature or the modern economic sociology. Explanations
of the embeddedness of the economic action can in fact be easily retrieved in
the work of the classical economists. While it is generally acknowledged that,
in the work of Marx and Ricardo, economic actors are deeply socialized, a num-
ber of authors find traces of the typical codewords pervading the social capital
literature (e.g. trust, norms, values, altruism, sympathy, and so on) in the work
of Smith as well (see for example Becker, 1981, Bruni, 2000, Fontaine, 2000).
In the Lectures on Jurisprudence, Smith states: “A dealer is afraid of losing his
character, and is scrupulous in performing every engagement. When a person
makes perhaps 20 contracts in a day, he cannot gain so much by endeavouring
to impose on his neighbours, as the very appearance of a cheat would make
him lose. Where people seldom deal with one another, we find that they are
somewhat disposed to cheat, because they can gain more by a smart trick than
they can lose by the injury which it does their character. (1763/1978, 539).
Smith’s argument basically refers to trading relationships, but it can be easily
generalized to every kind of interaction. A social environment rich of partic-
ipation opportunities, which allow people to meet frequently, creates a fertile
ground for nurturing trust and shared values. The higher likelihood of repeated
interactions increases the opportunity cost of free-riding in prisoner’s dilemma
kind of situations, thereby making the agents behaviour more foreseeable and
causing an overall reduction of uncertainty. In other words, social interactions
are a vehicle for the diffusion of information and trust which inevitably affect the
economic activity, so that the two spheres of individual action continuously fade
one another. Such claims more or less explicitly ground most of the contempo-
rary social capital research in economics. Smith’s view is similar to the modern
theories of social capital developed in sociology by Granovetter (1973), who ar-
gues that social ties work as bridges through which information and trust spread
across diverse communities and socioeconomic backgrounds. On the other side,
the value of reputation and social approval is considered by Smith one of the
main engines of human action. The importance of social approval is further
stressed by Bentham (1789), who makes a step forward by mentioning 15 ba-
sic wants grounding the economic action. Among them, the author lists the
pleasures of being on good terms with others, the pleasures of a good name, the
pleasures resulting from the view of any pleasure supposed to be possessed by the
beings who may be the objects of benevolence, and the pleasures resulting from
the view of any pain supposed to be suffered by the beings who may become the
objects of malevolence. The agents described by classical economists are thus
deeply rooted in the social context, and their economic activities strictly depend
on the complex of norms and relationships surrounding them. In our framework,
the embeddedness of economic action takes the form of a continuous osmosis
between the private and the relational spheres of the agents’ lives. As it will be
better outlined in the next section (devoted to the set up of the model), such
osmosis is modelled through the assumption that the well-being of the represen-
tative agent depends on the consumption of two types of good: material goods,
which in principle are produced in the private sphere of individuals, and socially
provided goods, concerning the relational life of agents. Relational goods are a
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distinctive type of good that can only be enjoyed if shared with others. They
are different from private goods, which are enjoyed alone, and standard public
goods, which can be enjoyed by any number (Uhlaner, 1989). A peculiarity of
relational goods is that it is virtually impossible to separate their production
from consumption, since they coincide (Gui and Sugden, 2005). For example,
a football match with friends is enjoyed (consumed) in the very moment of its
production (i.e. the 90’ spent on the sport field). The production processes of
the two types of good are not separated. Rather, they continuously fade one an-
other. The production and consumption of relational goods create durable ties
which accumulate in a stock defined as social capital. We implement the claims
from the empirical literature by assuming that such stock plays a crucial role
in the production of material goods. From this point of view, we embrace the
approaches proposed by the sociological and political science literature, where
social capital is treated as a collective resource or, in other terms, as a public
good (Bourdieu, 1980, 1986, Coleman,1988, 1990, Putnam, et al. 1993). At the
same time, private production contributes to the accumulation of social capital
too, since on the job interactions stimulate the creation of durable ties among
workers (see the next section for a more detailed explanation of this hypothesis).
Such ties in turn facilitate the production of new relational goods as well. In our
framework, the osmosis between the aspects of life is even more evident when
it brings about “negative” effects, i.e. when the expansion of one of the spheres
causes a shrinking of the other. For example, the model shows the conditions
under which an increase in the importance of private production and consump-
tion may lead to social isolation, moreover pointing out which role technology
may play in such a substitution process.
3 Set up of the model
We consider a population of size 1 constituted by a continuum of identical
agents. We assume that, in each instant of time t, the well-being of the repre-
sentative agent depends on the consumption C(t) of a private good and on the
consumption B(t) of a socially provided good.We assume that B(t) is produced
by means of the joint action of the time devoted by the representative agent to
social activities, s(t), of the economy-wide average social participation s(t) and
of the stock of social capital Ks(t):
B(t) = F [s(t), s(t),Ks(t)] (1)
The average social participation s(t) and the current stock of social capital
Ks(t) are crucial arguments, since relational goods can only be enjoyed if shared
with others (Uhlaner, 1989). If the social environment is rich of participation
opportunities, because many people participate (s(t) is high) and there are well-
established networks of relations (Ks(t) is high), then the individual production
of relational goods is easier (Antoci et al., 2005, 2007). Still, the production of
relational goods requires a certain effort by individuals as well, s(t). The time
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the representative agent does not spend on social participation, 1− s(t), is used
as an input in the production of the output Y (t) of the private sector.
Starting from the assumption that social capital can be treated as a factor of
production or, at least, as a factor affecting transaction costs (see for example
Paldam and Svendsen, 2000), we model one of the most debated claims from
the empirical literature by assuming that social capital also plays a role in the
production process of the private good.
In addition, for simplicity, we assume that C(t) = Y (t), that is Y (t) cannot
be accumulated, and that the production process of Y (t) requires only the inputs
1− s(t) and Ks(t):
C(t) = Y (t) = G [1− s(t),Ks(t)] (2)
The functions F and G in (1) and (2) are assumed to be strictly increasing
in each argument. Note that 1− s(t) can be interpreted as the time spent both
to produce and to consume C(t).
For simplicity, we consider the following Cobb-Douglas specifications for
(1),(2):
Y (t) = [1− s(t)] ·Kαs (t) (3)
B(t) = sβ(t) · s1−β(t) ·Kγs (t) (4a)
Where α, γ > 0 and 1 > β > 0; the parameters β, 1−β and γ are the elasticities
of B with respect to s, s and Ks, respectively:
∂B
∂s
B
s = β,
∂B
∂s
B
s = 1− β,
∂B
∂Ks
B
Ks = γ
In particular, β represents the agents’ ability to contribute to the pro-
duction/consumption of relational goods through their own effort into social
participation, given the participation of the others and the stock of social capi-
tal. Such parameter may depend on a series of “psychological”, “cultural”, and
“technological” factors. From a psychological point of view, it is noteworthy
that charismatic agents may be able to carry away other people in interpersonal
relations even if the surrounding environment is not rich of social participation
opportunities, i.e. if s(t) and Ks(t) are low, or if 1− β and γ are low. Sociolog-
ical studies have indeed claimed that charismatic agents behaving as leaders in
networks may act as catalysts for the creation of social capital (see for example
Burt, 1999).
The time evolution of social capital is assumed to depend on the aver-
age social participation s, on the aggregate time spent on the production and
consumption of the private good 1− s and on the stock of social capital:
K˙s = I(s, 1− s,Ks)− ηKs = s
δ · (1− s)ε ·Ks − ηKs (5)
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where K˙s(t) indicates the time derivative of Ks(t), and 1 > δ, ε, η > 0.
The exponent of Ks in the function I(s, 1− s,Ks) is assumed to be equal to 1
since we aim at analyzing a context in which the unbounded growth of Ks is
(at least a priori) possible; however, posing the exponent strictly higher than 1
gives rise to “explosive” growth paths of Ks along which Ks goes to infinity in
finite time. The parameter η indicates the depreciation rate of Ks; its value is
positive because social ties need care to be preserved over time.
The parameters δ and εmeasure the elasticities, with respect to the variables
s and 1− s, of the “investment function” I in social capital:
∂I
∂s
I
s = δ,
∂I
∂(1−s)
I
(1− s) = ε
If ε = 0, then the production of the private good has no effect on the time
evolution of social capital. If δ = 0, the accumulation of social capital is not
influenced by social participation.
In our framework, social participation takes the form of the consumption of
relational goods. Following Coleman (1988), we assume that the networks of
durable ties forming the stock of social capital are created and strengthened as
an incidental by-product of social participation, to an extent determined by the
elasticity δ. However, we assume that durable ties may flourish in the context of
private production as well, to an extent measured by the elasticity ε. Friendships
often start on the workplace. It is noteworthy that, in political science, several
schools of thought claim that citizens can develop their relational and political
attitudes on the job (Mutz and Mondak, 2006). Moreover, the workplace is a
training ground where people improve those communication and organizational
abilities which are crucial for the production and consumption of relational
goods (Karasek, 1976). Last but not least, besides its productive purposes, the
workplace can be seen as a “social structure”. Being involved in such structure
helps agents to nurture their self-esteem, thereby raising their will and ability
to engage in interpersonal relationships. By contrast, the condition of being
outside the structure hampers social interaction through at least two channels,
related to: a) the lack of the material resources that are often complementary
for the production/consumption of relational goods (e.g. the money for paying
the sports equipment); b) the fall in life-satisfaction, which can lead to forms
of depression encouraging social isolation (Clark and Oswald, 1994, Benz and
Frey, 2008, Brereton et al., 2008, Cornelißen, 2009, Knabe and Rätzel, 2009).
The model also acknowledges the path-dependent nature of social capital.
According to prominent authors emphasizing the “cultural” nature of social
capital (see for example Fukuyama, 1995, and the conclusions of the “Italian
work” by Putnam et al., 1993), norms and networks are deeply rooted in the
past history of a territory. In this paper, the time evolution of social capital
depends also on the current level of its stock. Note that arguments s, 1 − s,
and Ks are all essential for the creation of social capital. If just one among s,
1− s, and Ks is equal to zero, then the time evolution of social capital will be
negative, due to the depreciation phenomenon.
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Finally, we assume that the instantaneous utility of the representative agent
is represented by the following CES function:
U(C,B) = [λC−θ + (1− λ)B−θ]−
1
θ (6)
where θ ∈ (−1,+∞), θ = 0, and λ ∈ (0, 1). Here we model the assumption
that the agents’ well-being depends on private and relational goods. As we state
in the introduction, these goods serve different needs. However, we introduce
the possibility that private goods substitute for relational ones in the satisfac-
tion of social needs, or, at least, for compensating the deprivation of human
interactions. For example, a material, highly technological intensive, good like
a playstation can (partially) console for the unavailability of 21 friends to play
football on a sport field. The extent to which such substitution processes can
take place is given by the parameter λ, which represents the relative weight of
private consumption in the agents’ utility function, and by ρ = 11+θ , measuring
the (constant) elasticity of substitution between C and B.
For θ → 0, we have ρ → 1, so (6) approaches the Cobb-Douglas utility
function; for θ > 0 (respectively, θ < 0), the elasticity of substitution between
C and B is lower (higher) than that of the Cobb-Douglas utility function. We
will refer to the case θ > 0 (respectively, θ < 0) by saying that there is “low”
(respectively, “high”) substitutability between B and C or that B and C are
“complements” (respectively, “substitutes”).
For θ → −1, the goods C and B tend to be perfect substitutes, that is ρ→
+∞. If this condition holds, then the utility of a combination of C and B is an
increasing function of the sum of the two amounts. If there is a price difference,
there would be no demand for the more expensive good. The substitution of
material goods for relational activities sounds likely, if not unavoidable, and it
is immediately evident that technology may play a fundamental role in such a
process.
For θ → +∞, ρ → 0: in this case, the goods C and B tend to be perfect
complements. In this extreme case, material and relational goods are like the
right and the left piece of a pair of shoes and the representative agent has a
Leontief-like utility function, such that U(C,B) = min {C,B}. In this context,
even the most sophisticated playstation will not compensate for the lack of a
“team” of friends to play and interact with.
We assume that the representative agent solves the following maximization
problem:
max
s(t)
∫ +∞
0
U(C,B)e−rtdt (7)
under the constraint (5); the parameter r measures the subjective discount
rate. Being economic agents a continuum, the choice of s(t) by each agent has
no effect on the aggregate value s(t); consequently, in each instant of time t, the
representative agent takes s(t) and Ks(t) as exogenously given. This implies
that, for every instant of time t, the solution s(t) of problem (8) coincides with
the solution of the following static maximization problem:
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max
s
{
[(1− s) ·Kαs ]
−θ +
(
sβ · s1−β ·Kγs
)−θ}− 1θ
(8)
subject to the constraint s ∈ [0, 1].
4 The evolution of social participation
Since all agents make the same choice of s(t), the aggregate social participation
s(t) coincides (ex post) with the social participation s(t) chosen by the repre-
sentative agent. Writing the first order conditions for problem (8) (given s(t))
and substituting (ex post) s(t) = s(t), we obtain the Nash equilibrium value
s∗(t) of s(t), for each instant of time t:
s∗ =
(
β 1−λ
λ
) 1
θ+1 K
θα−γ
θ+1
s(
β 1−λ
λ
) 1
θ+1 K
θ α−γ
θ+1
s + 1
(9)
where 1 > s∗ > 0 always holds.
Note that s∗ is increasing in β, i.e. social participation increases with the ability
of agents to influence their relational sphere through their own effort (see (4a)).
The following proposition shows how the equilibrium social participation s∗
varies according to an increase in the stock Ks of social capital.
Proposition 1 The Nash equilibrium value s∗ of social participation is increas-
ing in Ks if θ(α− γ) > 0 and decreasing if θ(α− γ) < 0.
The proof of this proposition is straightforward. Note that α and γ are the
elasticities with respect to Ks of the private production Y and of the produc-
tion/consumption of the relational good B, respectively:
∂Y
∂Ks
Y
Ks = α,
∂B
∂Ks
B
Ks = γ
Remember that, for θ > 0, the elasticity of substitution between C and B is
lower than that of the Cobb-Douglas utility function.
Summarizing, the time allocation choice s∗ is determined by the degree of sub-
stitutability between C and B and by the relative importance of social capital
Ks in the production of the two types of good (expressed by the sign of the
difference α− γ). In particular, we have that:
1. If θ > 0, i.e. there is “low” substitutability between C and B (C and B are
“complements”) and if the “importance” of Ks in the production of Y is
higher than in the production/consumption of B (that is, if α > γ), then
the equilibrium social participation s∗ is increasing in Ks. In this context,
agents will be interested in preserving the production of the good where
productivity has registered the lower increase2 . Under this parameters’
2Remember that, if θ→ +∞, then the utility function “converges” to a Leontief-like form.
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configuration (θ > 0 and α > γ), after an increase in Ks, the productivity
of time grows less in the “social” than in the “private” sphere. Then,
agents will devote more time to relational activities. They will not be
willing to “commodify” all their time, and social participation is more
likely to be preserved.
A positive correlation between s∗ and Ks also exists if θ < 0, i.e. there is
“high” substitutability between C and B (C and B are “substitutes”), and
α < γ (Ks is less important in the production of Y than in the produc-
tion/consumption of B). In this case, after an increase in social capital,
agents will devote more time to social participation because the “social”
sector has higher returns. Thanks to the high degree of substitutability,
individuals will be willing to replace private goods with relational ones.
2. In the same way, a negative correlation between s∗ and Ks exists if θ > 0
and α < γ or if θ < 0 and α > γ.
In fact, if there is low substitutability between C and B (θ > 0) and
Ks is more important in the production/consumption of B than in the
production of C (α < γ), then agents will be interested in preserving
private production at the expenses of social participation. If there is high
substitutability (θ < 0) and Ks is more important in the production of C
than in that of B (α > γ), then agents will devote more time to the sector
with higher returns. Thus, they will replace relational goods with private
ones, once again at the expenses of social participation.
The results described above can be summarized as follows. If the two goods
are “complements”, individuals will devote more time to the production with
lower returns. In this case, if an increase in the stock of social capital makes the
productivity in the private sector grow less than that in the relational sector,
then agents will reduce their social participation, in order to obtain a balanced
growth of their material and relational consumptions. Think for example to a
narrow-minded social environment where going out with friends requires expen-
sive clothes and a prestigious car. Here, a strengthening of the existing networks
will lead agents to work more, at the expenses of social participation, in order to
earn the income necessary for acquiring material goods. If the substitutability
between the two goods is “high”, then the representative agent will devote more
time to the sector with higher returns.
Clearly, the degree of substitutability between private and relational goods
plays a key role in the evolution of social participation. The parameter θ may be
shaped mainly by moral and cultural factors. For example, a culture exalting
the prominence of reciprocity and solidarity in social life, and acknowledging
the importance of non market relations in respect to material consumption,
may noticeably reduce the elasticity of substitution between C and B. If people
are not willing to “commodify” all their time, then the replacement of relational
goods with material ones may be perceived as too painful. In such a scenario,
social participation is more likely to be preserved. In a more materialistic society,
where material possessions are believed to fill all human needs and are perceived
11
as a distinctive feature of the quality of life, the degree of substitutability is
likely to be higher. Moreover, in this cultural context, agents may be more
tempted to exploit human relations to the purposes of increasing their material
wealth. An additional result is that any possible increase in the stock of social
capital is likely to raise the productivity in the private sector more than in the
social sphere of life. In our framework, such a scenario leads to a parameters’
configuration (θ < 0 and α > γ) which creates the premises for a progressive
reduction in social participation over time.
5 Dynamics
In equation (5), s(t) must be replaced by the solution s∗ to the problem (8).
The resulting dynamics are not optimal. However, each trajectory under such
dynamics represents a Nash equilibrium path of the economy in that, along it,
no agent has an incentive to modify his choices if the others do not revise theirs
as well.
The (Nash) equilibrium dynamics can be written as follows:
K˙s =
 (β 1−λλ ) 1θ+1 Kθα−γθ+1s(
β 1−λ
λ
) 1
θ+1 K
θ α−γ
θ+1
s + 1
δ Ks[(
β 1−λ
λ
) 1
θ+1 Ks
θα−γ
θ+1 + 1
]ε − ηKs =
=
hδK
δθ α−γ
θ+1 +1
s(
hK
θα−γ
θ+1
s + 1
)ε+δ − ηKs (10)
where h :=
(
β 1−λ
λ
) 1
θ+1 > 0. The following propositions show the basic proper-
ties of dynamics (10). In the remaining part of the paper, propositions’ proofs
will be omitted when straightforward.
Proposition 2 Along the trajectories of equation (10), the values of the utility
function U and of Ks are positively correlated. This implies that if there exist
two steady states K
1
s and K
2
s such that K
2
s > K
1
s, then K
2
s Pareto-dominates
K
1
s; that is, K
1
s is a poverty trap, when attracting.
Proposition 3 If α = γ, a perpetual growth path of the stock of social capital
Ks does not exist under equation (10); that is, no trajectory exists along which
Ks → +∞ for t→ +∞.
Proof. Suppose that such perpetual growth path exists. Then there exists
t̂ such that K˙s
Ks
= K
δθ α−γ
θ+1
s
hδ(
hK
θ
α−γ
θ+1
s +1
)ε+δ − η > 0, ∀t > t̂. But under such
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hypothesis, we have lim
t→+∞
K
δθα−γ
θ+1
s
hδ(
hK
θ
α−γ
θ+1
s +1
)ε+δ = 0. Then there exists t′
such that K˙s
Ks
< 0, ∀t > t′, which is a contradiction.
In the context α = γ, an increase in Ks generates an increase in s∗ (i.e. in
s) and consequently a reduction in 1− s∗, or vice-versa; in both the cases, the
coefficient sδ(1− s)ε of Ks in equation (5) approaches 0 for high enough values
of Ks, thereby hampering the accumulation of social capital over time. This
motivates the nonexistence of trajectories along which Ks grows without bound.
Only in the context α = γ, in which an increase in Ks does not affect the
time allocation between social and private activities, the economy can follow a
trajectory of unbounded growth of Ks. In such a case, social participation s
∗ is
not affected by variations in Ks and social capital grows at the rate:
K˙s
Ks
=
hδ
(h+ 1)
ε+δ
− η
which is strictly positive if η < hδ/ (h+ 1)ε+δ. Such a condition is more likely
to hold when the depreciation rate of social capital η, and the relative weight of
private consumption λ have a low value. In other words, the unbounded growth
of the stock of social capital is possible in a scenario where: a) agents are
interested in taking care of their interpersonal relationships, thereby preventing
their cooling over time; b) the consumption of material goods is of rather limited
importance in determining life satisfaction.
Since an unbounded growth of Ks is not possible when α = γ, every trajectory
of equation (10) always approaches a stationary state.
The following proposition gives a complete classification of the possible dynamic
regimes.
Proposition 4 If α = γ, the dynamic regimes under equation (10) can be
classified as follows:
(1) If η <
(
δ
ε
)δ
/( δ
ε
+ 1)
ε+δ
, then three stationary states, K
0
s = 0, K
1
s and
K
2
s, with K
0
s < K
1
s < K
2
s, exist. The stationary state K
1
s is repulsive while K
0
s
and K
2
s are locally attractive (see Figure 1.a).
(2) If η >
(
δ
ε
)δ
/( δ
ε
+ 1)
ε+δ
, then the stationary state K
0
s = 0 is globally
attractive (see Figure 1.b).
Proof. K
0
s = 0 is always a stationary state. The other stationary states are
given by the solutions of the equation:
g(Ks) :=
hδK
δθ α−γ
θ+1
s(
hK
θα−γ
θ+1
s + 1
)ε+δ = η
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It is easy to check that lim
Ks→0
g(Ks) = lim
Ks→+∞
g(Ks) = 0 and that g
′(Ks) 
0 for Ks  K∗s :=
(
δ
hε
) θ+1
θ(α−γ) . Consequently, two stationary states exist if
g(K∗s ) > η, that is, if η <
(
δ
ε
)δ
/( δ
ε
+ 1)
ε+δ
.
According to the above proposition, the stationary state K
0
s = 0 is always
locally attractive; such a poverty trap is avoidable (in the context (1) of the
above proposition) starting from an initial value of Ks greater than K
1
s. So K
1
s
represents the threshold value separating the basins of attraction of K
0
s and K
2
s.
Once again, the depreciation rate of the stock of social capital plays a crucial
role in determining the final destination of the economy. If it is low enough,
then the economy may be attracted by the stationary state K
2
s characterized
by positive endowments of social capital.
Figure 1: (a) Dynamics in the context η <
(
δ
ε
)δ
/( δ
ε
+ 1)
ε+δ
(b) Dynamics in
the context η >
(
δ
ε
)δ
/( δ
ε
+ 1)
ε+δ
6 Social participation as the unique engine of
the accumulation of social capital
The set up of the model described in the previous section accounts for the
possibility that the time 1−s spent in the production process of material goods
plays a positive role in the accumulation of social capital,. As briefly outlined
above, such a role basically unfolds through two main channels: a) the workplace
constitutes a possibly fertile ground for nurturing interpersonal relationships and
creating durable ties; b) the condition of being employed and integrated in a
work structure fosters the workers’ self-esteem, thereby improving his bent for
social interaction. In our model’s lexis, the above hypotheses are synthesized
by a positive value of the parameter ε. In this section, we pose ε = 0 in order
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to analyze the dynamics under the assumption that social participation is the
unique engine of the accumulation of social capital. By posing ε = 0 in (10) we
obtain:
K˙s = s
δKs − ηKs =
 hKθα−γθ+1s
hK
θα−γ
θ+1
s + 1
δKs − ηKs (11)
The basic properties of dynamics under equation (11) are illustrated by the
following proposition.
Proposition 5 The stationary states of dynamics (11) are:
K
0
s = 0, K
1
s =
 η 1δ
h
(
1− η
1
δ
)

θ+1
θ(α−γ)
(1) If θ(α−γ) > 0, then the stationary state K
0
s is locally attractive andK
1
s is
repulsive (see Figure 2.a). The economy follows a growth trajectory along which
Ks → +∞ if it starts from an initial value Ks(0) greater than the threshold
value K
1
s.
(2) If θ(α − γ) < 0, then the stationary state K
0
s is repulsive and K
1
s is
globally attractive (see Figure 2.b). The economy cannot follow a trajectory
along which Ks grows without bound.
Figure 2: (a) Dynamics in the context θ(α − γ) > 0 (b) Dynamics in the
context θ(α− γ) < 0
The proof of this Proposition is straightforward. According to it, the stock
of social capital can follow a path of unbounded growth only if θ(α − γ) > 0,
that is, in the context where the equilibrium social participation s∗is positively
correlated to Ks. Such condition holds (see Proposition 1) if there is “low”
substitutability between B and C (that is, if θ > 0) and if the “importance” of
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Ks in the production of C is higher than in the production/consumption of B
(that is, if α > γ) or in the opposite case θ < 0, α < γ.
In the case with low substitutability θ > 0, α > γ, agents will be interested
in preserving the consumption of the good in whose production process pro-
ductivity has registered the lower increase; so, after an increase in the stock of
social capital, the productivity of the time spent on social participation grows
less than that of the time spent on private activities. Agents will devote more
time to the relational sphere of their lives. In the case θ < 0, α < γ, after
an increase in social capital, agents will devote more time to social participa-
tion because the social sector has higher returns. In such a scenario, thanks to
the high degree of substitutability, individuals will be willing to replace private
goods with relational ones.
Being s∗positively correlated toKs in the case θ(α−γ) > 0, the variations in
the stock of Ks tend to be self-enforcing: an increase (respectively, a decrease)
in Ks leads to an increase (decrease) in s∗ which in turn gives rise to a further
increase (decrease) in Ks. This mechanism explains the coexistence between
growth paths approaching the poverty trap K
0
s = 0 and growth paths along
which Ks grows without bound. The opposite holds in the context θ(α − γ),
where the negative correlation between s∗ and Ks does not lead the economy
neither to approach K
0
s = 0 nor to follow a path of perpetual growth of Ks.
7 Exogenous technological progress
In the framework developed in the previous sections, the degree of substitutabil-
ity between private and relational goods plays a key role in the evolution of social
participation. As we already hinted in the introduction, it is rather intuitive
that technology can in turn crucially influence the substitution process. In this
section, we introduce exogenous technical progress in the scenarios where an un-
bounded growth of the stock of social capital is possible. The primary research
questions to which we aim to provide an answer here are: which is the role of
technology in determining the trajectories of the economy in respect to social
participation and social capital? Is the Solaria syndrome an actual risk? If this
is the case, a better understanding of the mechanisms supporting the syndrome
would be a first step along the path to find a cure.
Here we assume that technical progress raises the productivity both in the pri-
vate and in the relational sectors. The assumption is based on the observation
that technology can help the production of relational goods in a variety of ways.
Communication technologies are of great support in establishing new ties with
unknown people (this is often the case of online networks like Facebook and
Flickr and, more in general, of the infrastructures allowing their diffusion, like
computers and the broadband), in keeping in touch with old friends (think for
example of Friendfeed and Twitter, or about the ability of Facebook to recon-
nect people with school and college mates), and in arranging meetings with kin
and friends we are used to see in our everyday life (besides the online networks
cited above, consider for example the unquestionable role of cell-phones, emails,
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and newer tools like Skype and Messenger). The production functions of the
two goods can now be expressed as:
Y (t) = [1− s(t)] ·Kαs (t) · T
π(t)
B(t) = sβ(t) · s1−β(t) ·Kγs (t) · T
ψ(t)
where π, ψ > 0 are parameters and T represents technological progress, growing
at the exogenous rate µ > 0:
·
T = µT (12)
According to (12), T (t) = T (0)eµt holds.
In this context, the time allocation choice and the accumulation dynamics of
social capital are given by:
s∗ =
hT θ
π−ψ
θ+1 K
θα−γ
θ+1
s
hT θ
π−ψ
θ+1 K
θα−γ
θ+1
s + 1
(13)
K˙s =
 hT θ π−ψθ+1 Kθα−γθ+1s
hT θ
π−ψ
θ+1 K
θα−γ
θ+1
s + 1
δ ·Ks − ηKs (14)
where h :=
(
β 1−λ
λ
) 1
θ+1 > 0. In order to analyze (14), we define the variable:
H := T θ
π−ψ
θ+1 K
θα−γ
θ+1
s (15)
whose time derivative is given by:
H˙ = θT θ
π−ψ
θ+1 K
θ α−γ
θ+1
s
(
α− γ
θ + 1
K˙s
Ks
+
π − ψ
θ + 1
T˙
T
)
=
=
θ
θ + 1
H
[
(α− γ)
K˙s
Ks
+ (π − ψ)
T˙
T
]
=
=
θ
θ + 1
H
(α− γ)
 hT θ π−ψθ+1 Kθα−γθ+1s
hT θ
π−ψ
θ+1 K
θ α−γ
θ+1
s + 1
δ + (π − ψ)µ− (α− γ)η
 =
=
θ
θ + 1
H
[
(α− γ)
[(
hH
hH + 1
)δ
− η
]
+ (π − ψ)µ
]
(16)
Notice that (16) admits at most one stationary state with H > 0. Such station-
ary state exists if and only if:
1 >
η(α− γ)− µ(π − ψ)
α− γ
> 0 (17)
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and it is given by:
H∗ =
1
h
[
η(α−γ)−µ(π−ψ)
α−γ
] 1
δ
1−
[
η(α−γ)−µ(π−ψ)
α−γ
] 1
δ
(18)
When H → +∞, the right side of (16) tends to:
θ
θ + 1
H [(1− η)(α− γ) + µ(π − ψ)]
i.e. dynamics (16), for H high enough, can be approximated by the following
equation:
H˙ =
θ
θ + 1
H [(1− η)(α− γ) + µ(π − ψ)]
Thus, in order to obtain H˙ > 0 in the lung run, the following condition must
hold:
θ
θ + 1
[(1− η)(α− γ) + µ(π − ψ)] > 0 (19)
Along the trajectories where H˙ remains definitively positive, the time evolution
of H is thus approximated by the following function:
H(t) = H(0)e
θ
θ+1 [(1−η)(α−γ)+µ(π−ψ)]t (20)
Since (16) is an autonomous differential equation, the analysis outlined above
allows us to carry out a complete classification of the dynamic regimes under
(16) based on the conditions (17) and (19).
Proposition 6 The dynamic regimes generated by the equation (16) can be
classified as follows:
1. If 1 > η(α−γ)−µ(π−ψ)
α−γ
> 0 and θ
θ+1 [(1− η)(α− γ) + µ(π − ψ)] > 0,
then there exists an interior stationary state H∗, which is repulsive. Starting
from an initial value H(0) < H∗, then H → 0; starting from H(0) > H∗, then
H → +∞.
2. If 1 > η(α−γ)−µ(π−ψ)
α−γ
> 0 and θ
θ+1 [(1− η)(α− γ) + µ(π − ψ)] < 0, then
there exists an interior stationary state H∗, which is globally attractive.
3. If η(α−γ)−µ(π−ψ)
α−γ
< 0 ∨ η(α−γ)−µ(π−ψ)
α−γ
> 1 and θ
θ+1 [(1− η)(α− γ) + µ(π − ψ)] >
0, then an interior stationary state H∗ does not exist and H → +∞ for every
initial value H(0) > 0.
4. If η(α−γ)−µ(π−ψ)
α−γ
< 0 ∨ η(α−γ)−µ(π−ψ)
α−γ
> 1 and θ
θ+1 [(1− η)(α− γ) + µ(π − ψ)] <
0, then an interior stationary state H∗ does not exist and H → 0 for every initial
value H(0) > 0.
According to the above proposition, it is easy to check that the following
three different scenarios can occur:
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Scenario 1: H = T
θ
θ+1 (π−ψ)K
θ α−γ
θ+1
s → 0 (cases 1 and 4 of the above proposi-
tion). In this case, s∗ → 0 and consequently Ks → 0, for t→ +∞.
Scenario 2: H = T
θ
θ+1 (π−ψ)K
θα−γ
θ+1
s → +∞ (cases 1 and 3). In this case, s∗ → 1
and consequently Ks → +∞, for t→ +∞.
Scenario 3: H = T
θ
θ+1 (π−ψ)K
θα−γ
θ+1
s → H∗ (case 2). In this case, Ks behaves
differently according to the sign of θ, α − γ and π − ψ. In particular,
if θ(π − ψ) > 0, then T (π−ψ)
θ
θ+1 → ∞ holds and consequently Ks → 0
or Ks → +∞ holds if, respectively, θ(α − γ) > 0 or θ(α − γ) < 0. If
θ(π − ψ) < 0, then T (π−ψ)
θ
θ+1 → 0 holds and consequently Ks → +∞ or
Ks → 0 holds if, respectively, θ(α− γ) > 0 or θ(α− γ) < 0.
When T equally contributes to the production of material and relational
goods (i.e. π = ψ), the time allocation choices are not affected by technical
progress. In this extreme case, we have the same results obtained in the frame-
work without exogenous technical progress.
The above proposition shows that either Ks → 0 or Ks → +∞ may hold,
that is, Ks cannot approach a strictly positive value.
The previous proposition has the following corollary, which provides the
necessary and sufficient conditions allowing for the existence of trajectories along
which Ks → +∞:
Proposition 7 Under dynamics (16), there exist trajectories along whichKs →
+∞ if and only if either3
a) (α− γ)(π − ψ) < 0 (that is, α− γ and π − ψ have opposite signs) or
b) sign(θ) = sign(α − γ) = sign(π − ψ) (that is, α − γ, π − ψ and θ have
the same sign).
It is worth noting that condition b) is analogous to that allowing for an
unbounded growth of Ks in the model without technical progress, which can be
rewritten as follows:
sign(θ) = sign(α− γ) (21)
Thus, comments to Proposition 5 also apply to condition b). The scenarios
described by this condition are characterized by the fact that both technical
progress and the accumulation of social capital cause a higher productivity
increase in the same sector. If B and C are “complements” (i.e. θ > 0),
then the unbounded growth of social capital occurs if and only if an increase
in T and Ks raises the productivity of the time spent on the production of
private goods more than that of the time spent on social participation (case
α−γ > 0, π−ψ > 0). In such a context, agents are concerned with supporting
the production process where productivity has registered the lower increase.
3For simplicity, we limit our analysis to “robust” cases, where α− γ = 0 and π − ψ = 0.
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Thus they will devote more time to relational activities, causing an increase in
social participation which in turn fuels the accumulation process of Ks.
If B and C are “substitutes” (θ > 0), then the satisfaction of condition b)
requires that an increase in T and Ks improves the relative performance of the
relational sector (case α−γ < 0, π−ψ < 0). In such a case, after an increase in
T and Ks, agents will devote more time to social participation because, thanks
to the “high degree” of substitutability, they prefer to replace private goods
with relational ones.
Condition a) of the above proposition deals with “mixed” contexts, where
technical progress and social capital exert a diverse influence on the two sectors.
Under such condition, there always exist trajectories along which Ks → +∞,
whatever the sign of θ is. A typical mixed context occurs when technical progress
raises the productivity in the private sector more than in the relational one
(π − ψ > 0). In this case, Ks can tend to infinite only if increases in its stock
play a higher role in the production of relational goods (α− γ < 0). However,
in previous sections we have acknowledged the possibility that increases in the
stock of social capital raise the productivity in the private sector more than what
they do in the social sphere of the individual action (α− γ > 0). In the context
of highly technology-intensive productions taking place in a mature economy,
a good relational atmosphere inside the firm and in the surrounding social en-
vironment can in fact easily make the difference. In such a case, according to
our results, the preservation of social participation is more likely if technical
progress plays a higher role in the social sphere of individuals, rather than in
the private production of material goods. This scenario is less weird than we
could think at a first glance. Technology has literally invaded every sphere of
our everyday life, included the field of social interactions. A growing part of our
human interactions now takes place online, in the context of virtual networks
like Facebook, Twitter, and Flickr, just to mention a few. For example, Meetic
is an ever more popular place to arrange dates, and the number of engagements
between people who met on Meetic-like platforms is exponentially growing in
the last years. The context hypothesized by case a) of the previous proposition
may thus look as a “socially sustainable” development path, along which tech-
nology and social interaction balance one another in fostering the growth of the
private and the social sectors of the economy.
In other words, if certain conditions hold, and thanks to the boom in technology-
driven communication and interaction, technical progress can push the economy
to approach scenarios which are very far from the Solaria nightmare described
in Asimov’s novels. However, the possibility exists of a progressive reduction of
the relational sphere of individuals, as it happens when conditions a) and b) of
the above proposition are not satisfied. Asimov’s Solaria is a world character-
ized by weak moral norms and the absence of any form of communitarian life,
where material goods play an exaggerated role in determining life-satisfaction.
A reader can enjoy himself in comparing his social environment (from the neigh-
borhood to the nation-wide level) with Solaria, to imagine to what extent it is
subject to contract the syndrome.
Figures 3.a and 3.b show, respectively, the time evolution of Ks and of
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well-being (measured by the value U(C,B) of the utility function (6)) along
the trajectory starting from the initial conditions Ks(0) = 0.001, T (0) = 1;
parameter values are: α = 0.8, β = 0.1, γ = 0.12, δ = 0.1, η = 0.61, θ = 0.5,
λ = 0.5, µ = 0.13, π = 0.6, ψ = 0.1. Note that the time evolution of Ks and
U(C,B) exhibits an initial growth followed by a decline.
Figure 3: (a) Time evolution of social capital (b) Time evolution of well-being
Figure 4 shows an example of path dependence: the stock of social capital
approaches zero along the trajectory starting from Ks(0) = 600, T (0) = 0.1
while it grows without bound along the that starting from Ks(0) = 750, T (0) =
0.1; parameter values are: α = 0.9, β = 0.81, γ = 0.29, δ = 0.931, η = 0.9,
θ = 7.9195, λ = 0.2, µ = 0.0053, π = 1, ψ = 0.2.
Figure 4: An example of path dependence
8 Concluding remarks
In our paper, we have analyzed the dynamics of an economy constituted by a
continuum of identical agents whose well-being, measured by the CES function
U(C,B) = [λC−θ + (1 − λ)B−θ]−
1
θ , depends on the consumption of a private
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good C and on the consumption of a relational good B. The parameter θ mea-
sures the degree of substitutability between B and C, which are “complements”
if θ > 0 and “substitutes” if θ < 0.
B and C are produced according to the production functions B = sβ · s1−β ·
Kγs and C = (1− s) ·K
α
s (t), where s is the time devoted by the representative
agent to social activities, s is the economy-wide average social participation
and Ks is the stock of social capital. In this context, we have analyzed the
interplay between consumption choices and social capital accumulation under
the following alternative assumptions:
1. The time evolution of Ks is given by K˙s = s
δ · (1 − s)ε ·Ks − ηKs, that
is job interactions (1− s) and social participation (s) are both essential
inputs of the accumulation process of social capital.
2. The time evolution of Ks is given by K˙s = s
δ ·Ks − ηKs, that is, social
participation is the unique engine of the accumulation of social capital.
3. The time evolution of Ks is given by K˙s = s
δ ·Ks−ηKs and, furthermore,
is conditioned by exogenous technical progress T , which enters in the
production functions of C and B: C = (1− s) ·Kαs · T
π, B = sβ · s1−β ·
Kγs · T
ψ.
We have shown that, under the assumption (1), no trajectory along which
Ks → +∞ (for t→ +∞) exists, in that either s→ 0 or s→ 1 (the limit of s
depends on the sign of θ, i.e. on the degree of substitutability between C and
B).
Under the assumption (2), trajectories along which Ks → +∞ exist if and
only if the condition θ(α−γ) > 0 holds. That is, if there is “low” substitutability
between B and C (θ > 0) and if the “importance” of Ks in the production
of C is higher than in the production/consumption of B (α > γ), or in the
opposite case θ < 0, α < γ. In both cases, the average social participation s
is positively correlated with Ks. in fact, in the case θ > 0, α > γ (C and B
are “complements” and an increase in Ks increases the relative productivity of
the time spent in the production of C), if Ks increases, agents raise their social
participation to preserve the consumption of the good in whose production
process productivity has registered the lower increase. On the other side, in the
case θ < 0, α < γ, after an increase in social capital, agents will devote more
time to social participation because the social sector has higher returns and B
is a “substitute” for C.
Finally, under the assumption (3), trajectories along which Ks → +∞ exist
if either a) α−γ, π−ψ and θ all have the same sign, or b) α−γ and π−ψ have
opposite signs. Condition a) describes scenarios where both technical progress
and the accumulation of social capital cause a higher productivity increase in
the same sector. Condition b) deals with “mixed” contexts, where technical
progress and social capital exert a diverse influence on the two sectors. In this
scenario, there always exist trajectories along which Ks → +∞, whatever the
sign of θ is.
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Even besides the inclusion of technical progress in the model, it is straight-
forward that technology plays a role in the substitution between material and
relational goods, thereby crucially influencing the evolution ofKs. Intuition and
literary fascinations may lead the reader to think that technology can possibly
harm social interaction. However, if we introduce exogenous technical progress
in the best-case scenarios (those where an unbounded growth of the stock of
social capital is possible), we find that, in some cases, technology can work
as an antidote to the destruction of human interaction feared in the Solaria
metaphor. The possibly positive role of technology emerges clearly in “mixed”
contexts, specially when increases in the stock of Ks support the private sector
more than the relational one. In such a case, the existence of trajectories along
which Ks → +∞ is always guaranteed as long as technical progress causes a
higher productivity increase in the social sphere of the economy, whatever the
sign of θ is. As outlined in the previous section, this scenario is less weird than
we could think at a first glance. The marginal productivity of technology-driven
communication can easily be higher in the production of relational goods, and
Facebook and Twitter can be viewed as striking examples of this phenomenon.
Configurations of the economy where social capital plays a major role in pri-
vate activities, while technical progress crucially support human relationships,
can thus be thinked of as socially sustainable development paths. Along such
tracks, technology and social interaction can balance one another in fostering
the growth of both the social and the private sector of the economy.
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